We estimate an equilibrium model of decision-making in the US Supreme Court which takes into account both private information and ideological differences between justices. We present a measure of the value of information in the court. Our measure is the probability that a justice votes differently that what she would have voted for in the absence of case specific information. We show that in roughly 44% of cases, justices' initial leanings -based on their priors and ideological biases -are changed by justices' personal assessments of the case. The results suggest a sizeable value of information. We evaluate the performance of the Court in different issues and time periods, and use counterfactual simulations to draw implications for institutional design. * The title follows words from Justice Ruth Ginsburg, "If confirmed, I will take the counsel to heart and strive to write opinions that both 'get it right' and 'keep it tight' " (statement submitted to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary). We thank Ernesto
close scrutiny in the press, and why the competence of candidates is a significant factor explaining the vote of Senators of whether to confirm or not a nominee Cover (1990, 1992) , Epstein, Lindstadt, Segal, and Westerland (2006) ). Qualifications matter because the decision-making process in the Court is not only ideological.
In this paper, we build on the existing literature to incorporate the value of information into the purely ideological framework of the spatial model. We provide an analysis of decision-making in the court taking into account not only the possible bias or ideology of justices, but also the information available to the justices in each case, as well as their ability -or skill, as Justice Stevens puts it -to map the law and the specifics of the case to an outcome. In this context, we ask: does the case information have enough power to overturn the prior biases and ideological considerations of the justices? Our analysis allows us to quantify precisely the degree to which justices "subordinated" their personal views and "interpreted" the law.
To tackle this question, we consider a model in which ideology interacts with common values in an incomplete information context. 3 We then estimate the parameters of the model from Supreme Court voting outcomes. In order to do this, we introduce a new estimation approach that allows us to handle our model of voting with common values and strategic agents.
In the model, we assume that the goal of any justice i in any given case t is that she/ the Court rules according to i's own best understanding of how the law applies to the particulars of the case.
We maintain that it is the residual uncertainty in the meaning of the law which allows justices to differ in their opinions about a case. With anything less than complete certainty, opinions can differ among justice because of idiosyncratic thresholds of proof brought by ideological differences, because of differences in the information that is effectively available to each justice, or because of differences in the ability to evaluate the available information in different contexts.
In particular, we assume that before ruling in each case, each justice observes a private, imperfectly informative signal, which reflects his or her understanding of the particulars of the case. The precision θ i of each justice' signal measures his or her ability to map the specifics of the case to the meaning of the law. Noisiness or imprecision in the information leaves room for interpretation, which allows ideological biases to come into play. These biases could reflect variation across a liberal/conservative dimension, theoretical arguments about the law, or other determinants for a non-neutral approach to cases. In the model, this bias or ideology boils down to a threshold π i such that the justice prefers to rule for the Plaintiff if and only if the probability that the law favors the Plaintiff is at least π i . Information precision and bias then interact to produce outcomes. Higher precision means that it is typically more clear for the justice whether the ruling should favor the Plaintiff or the Defendant according to the body of law. A larger bias means that despite her case information, a justice persists in going with his or her preconception of how to rule in a case like this.
In the estimation, we recover the values of (θ i , π i )|X for each justice i conditioning on observable covariates X of the cases (type of issue, characteristics of the Plaintiff and the Defendant, disposition of the lower courts) and the justices (judicial experience, court experience, political party, etc). To do this, we introduce a new estimation approach that allows us to handle our model of voting with common values and strategic agents. The model is estimated in two steps.
In the first step, using the observed votes, we estimate a "reduced-form" model of justices' probabilities of voting in favor of the Plaintiff when the law favors the Plaintiff and when the law favors the Defendant. In the second step, we recover the structural parameters characterizing justices' preferences and information services, using the equilibrium conditions in the voting model.
The main result of the paper is a measure of the value of information in the court. Our measure, FLEX, is the probability that a justice i votes differently that what he or she would vote for in the absence of case specific information. We show that in roughly 44% of cases, justices' initial leanings -which reflect their priors or their ideological biases -are changed by the case-specific private information of the justices. This suggests a large value of information in the court.
On the flip side, we also show that since the Warren court, Supreme Court justices in general have become less open-minded: average FLEX scores decreased 21 % in Economic cases, 36% in Criminal Procedure, and 30% in Federalism. Only in basic rights cases did FLEX scores increase over time, by a modest 8%. These trends are consistent with the politicization of confirmations of nominees to the Supreme Court emphasized by the literature (see in particular Epstein, Lindstadt, Segal, and Westerland (2006) ).
Additionally, we show that having the government as Plaintiff changes justices common prior beliefs significantly: across all issues, justices attach a higher probability to the government being right than they do a private party. On the other hand, in Criminal Procedure -where the effect of government on priors is the largest -justices are also significantly more demanding of the government. In terms of judicial review vs. statutory interpretation, we show that the basis of authority appears to have no effect on either bias or FLEX scores within Criminal Procedure, but that justices do appear to be more open-minded in cases that merit judicial review within Basic
Rights.
Finally, we use counterfactual simulations to draw implications for institutional design. In particular, we compare the performance of the court with a counterfactual scenario in which ruling against the Defendant requires the unanimous consent of the justices. 4 We show that for Basic Rights cases, majority rule outperforms unanimity rule in the Warren courts, but would have reduced total error rates in several Rehnquist courts. Similar conclusions can be drawn in other issues. With only nine justices, each with different preferences and abilities, majority rule does not generically dominate unanimity rule.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the relation with the literature. Section 3 introduces the theoretical model. Section 4 describes the data, and Section 5 describes the estimation procedure. Section 6 discusses the results. Section 7 concludes.
Related Literature
This paper builds on the significant contributions of a large literature. A first group of papers uses justices' voting data -the proportion of votes in favor and against the Defendant, or the proportion of liberal and conservative votes -to test various hypothesis in reduced form models. Segal and Cover (1989) show that the ideology of each justice -as measured by the proportion of liberal and conservative statements in newspaper editorials -is highly correlated with the votes of justices in civil liberties cases. Segal, Epstein, Cameron, and Spaeth (1995) expands the coverage of the original SC scores, and shows that the correlation is lower for other justices and other issues (economic regulation). Epstein and Mershon (1996) further argue that newspaper editorials are tilted towards a few "splashy" civil liberties issues, and show that the scores have little explanatory power for most non-civil liberty areas. Epstein, Hoekstra, Segal, and Spaeth (1998) argue that the preferences of justices -as measured by the proportion of liberal votes on civil liberties cases -changes through time. 5 Finally, Landes and Posner (2008) argues that members of a liberal or conservative minority do not tend to vote more often with the majority the larger the majority is. They also show that justices appointed by Democratic presidents (but not those appointed by Republican presidents) vote more liberally the fewer of them there are.
The first group of papers measures the ideological preferences of justices with the proportion of liberal statements in newspaper editorials or directly with the proportion of liberal votes by each justice. A second group of papers, by Martin and Quinn (2002, ????) , among others, employs a radically different approach to recover the ideology of the justices from the data. Martin and Quinn build on the influential literature analyzing voting records in legislatures (Poole and Rosenthal (1985, 1991) , Heckman and Snyder (1997) , Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers (2004) ). The main idea here is to assume that the voting data is generated by a precise model of behavior -the sincere spatial voting model (SVM) commonly employed in political science -and then estimate the parameters of the model from the voting data (i.e., structural estimation). Building on the findings of Epstein, Hoekstra, Segal, and Spaeth (1998) , Martin and Quinn also allow ideal policies to change flexibly through time, but the underlying theoretical model is otherwise the same as in the above papers. 6
For all its attractive properties, the sincere spatial voting model (SVM) has one severe limitation when applied to the analysis of voting in the Court: it is a pure private values model in which ideology is the only determinant of voting behavior. This precludes the possibility of common values and dispersed information which, as we argued above, seem central to the nature of decision-making in the court. 7 In this paper, we therefore structurally estimate a model that 5 See also Segal and Spaeth (1993) and Epstein and Knight (1997) . 6 More recently, Degan and Merlo (2008) and de Paula and Merlo (2009) consider the nonparametric identification and estimation of the ideological voting model. Coate and Conlin (2004) and Coate, Conlin, and Moro (2008) also perform structural estimation of strategic voting (ie. "pivotal voting") models, with ideological voters. See also Lim (2008) for structural estimation of a model that incorporates career concerns into judges' behavior.
7 The SVM does not preclude, however, a publicly known valence differential between alternatives. See Londregan (1999).
allows both ideology and precision of private information to come into play.
With common values and dispersed information, strategic considerations -which are absent in the sincere voting spatial model -come into play. 8, 9 In this paper we introduce a new estimation procedure to deal with ideology and common values in the context of equilibrium behavior. The closest effort is that of Iaryczower, Katz, and Saiegh (2009) , who model strategic voting and common values in Congress. The underlying theoretical model in that paper, however, is designed to deal with the bicameral aspect of Congress, and is otherwise less flexible than the model we consider here.
The Model
The court is composed of n justices, i = 1, . . . , n, who consider T independent cases, t = 1, . . . , T .
In each case t, justice i can rule in favor or against the Defendant. We denote this ruling by v t i ∈ {0, 1}, with v t i = 0 indicating a ruling in favor of the Defendant and v t i = 1 a ruling in favor of the Plaintiff. The court aggregates the decisions of the individual justices by simple majority rule; i.e. rules in favor of the Plaintiff (
2 and in favor of the Defendant (v t = d) otherwise.
We consider two related models of individual behavior. In the expressive or sincere voting model, we assume that in deciding their vote, justices care only about their individual vote. In the strategic or outcome-oriented voting model, we assume instead that justices care about the ruling of the court. We assume that the goal of any justice i in any given case t is that she (in the expressive voting model) or the court (in the strategic voting model) rules according to i's own best understanding of how the law applies to the particulars of the case. Specifically, we assume that if all the information relevant to the case and the law as applying to the case were available for justices' consideration, justices would agree on a ruling ω t ∈ {0, 1} either in favor of 8 See however Londregan (1999) , Clinton and Meirowitz (2003) and Clinton and Meirowitz (2004) , who analyze the spatial voting model without assuming sincere voting, paying attention to agendas and sequence.
9 It should be emphasized that we are referring here to strategic considerations that are internal to the Court. Justices may also be strategic in response to the behavior of political actors outside of the Court (the president, Congress). Whether Justices indeed respond or not to these outside pressures is a matter of debate in the literature, captured in the 'attitudinal' vs 'rational choice' camps (see Segal and Spaeth (1993) , Gely and Spiller (1990); Spiller and Gely (1992) ). Clearly, however, for all the rationality in our model, this paper is not any more in the 'rational choice' than in the 'attitudinal' camps. Also seeDaughety and Reinganum (2006) for an information-based model explaining how appellate judges may influence the cases that the SC chooses to hear.
the Plaintiff (ω t = 1) or the Defendant (ω t = 0). This ideal ruling represents the meaning of the law as it applies to the case, but is obviously unobserved by justices. 10 Because of this, justices will vote differently, depending on both their ideological biases as well as the amount and quality of the case-specific information which they observe.
Before ruling in each case t each justice i observes a private, imperfectly informative signal s it = ω t + σ i ε t , where ε t ∼ N (0, 1). Thus θ i = 1/σ i is a scale parameter that parametrizes the informativeness of i's signals. Our choice of this one-parameter specification of the information structure is dictated by our estimation and identification strategy, as we will describe below.
In addition to their signals of ω t , justices' voting decisions also depend on their ideological stances, as manifested in their preferences over outcomes. We assume that justice i has a payoff of −π i when she/the court rules incorrectly against the Defendant (v t = 1 when ω t = 0) and of The two alternative models of behavior differ in how much information each justice has in equilibrium. In the expressive voting model, justices care about their own ruling, and therefore vote based on their own information s it , i.e., rule against the Defendant whenever Pr i (ω t = P |s it ) ≥ π i .
Then E consists only of s it , and i votes to rule against the Defendant if
Let s exp i denote the value of s it that solves (1) with equality. Since by the MLRP the ratio L(s) ≡ Pr(s|ω t = 1)/ Pr(s|ω t = 0) is increasing in s, it follows that i rules against the Defendant 10 It is important to note, however, that given that ωt is unobservable, our framework allows any two given justices to disagree in any given case, and moreover, it allows any two (very biased) justices to disagree almost always.
11 In our setting, justices share common priors, but their ideological biases are captured by the πi parameters. See Froeb and Kobayashi (1996) 
In the strategic voting model, justices care about the ruling of the court. As a result, any justice i then considers the implications of her vote assuming that she is pivotal for the decision. 12
Here, the relevant information for justice i in case t is not only her private information s it , but also the equilibrium information contained in the event that i is pivotal for the court's decision,
given the equilibrium strategy profile followed by the remaining justices. Let
denote the strategy of justice j, where σ j (s j ) ≡ Pr(v jt = 1|s jt ). Then (1) becomes
But given the strict MLRP satisfied by the conditional normal distributions, this implies that the best response to any strategy σ −i of the remaining justices is a cutoff strategy, such that i rules against the Defendant (σ i (s i ) = 1) if s it implies (3), and in favor of the Defendant (σ i (s i ) = 0) otherwise. 13 This in turn implies that all responsive equilibria are cutoff equilibria;
i.e., that any equilibrium is characterized by cutpoints s * i for each justice i = 1, . . . , n such that justice i votes against the Defendant if and only if s it ≥ s * i . Now, given cutoff strategies,
. Therefore from (3), and letting C i R−1 denote the set of coalitions C ⊂ N \ i with R − 1 members, {s * i } n i=1 is given by the n equations
The cutpoints {s * i } completely characterize equilibrium behavior. Therefore we can write the likelihood of the justices' votes in case t in the strategic voting case as
12 This supposition is not correct when the justice is not in fact pivotal, but for the same reason these mistakes have no cost for the outcome-oriented justice.
13 The proof of this result follows Duggan and Martinelli (2001) , and is included in the appendix for convenience.
Note that the likelihood functions for the expressive and the strategic models (2,5) are almost identical, except for the cutoff points: s exp for the expressive model, and s * for the strategic model.
Data
Our data derives from two sources. The first is a database of votes and case-specific information from the Original United States Supreme Court Judicial Database (Spaeth (2008)). The second is a database of justice specific information comes from the United States Supreme Court Justice
Database (Epstein, Walker, Staudt, Hendrickson, and Roberts (2008) ).
The first database begins with the first term of the Warren Court (1953), continues through the Burger and Rehnquist Courts, and finishes with the 2008 term of the Roberts Court. For our purposes, it will be useful to distinguish periods in which the composition of the court remains unchanged (this is called a natural court in the literature). Given changes in the composition of the court, this creates a number of natural court per chief justice. As we will explain later, we will focus on decisions in which nine justices vote. 14 This restricts the list of natural courts in our sample to those with nine members. The upper panel of We include all such cases except memorandum cases and decrees, as well as those in which the court has original jurisdiction. To avoid repetitions we set analu = 0 (this conforms to standard practice).
15 A fifth residual category groups Miscellaneous cases (Spaeth's issues 980-99). tory construction at the national level), and Others (includes judicial review at the state level, supreme court supervision of lower federal courts, interpretation of administrative regulation or rule or executive order, interpretation of state laws, and federal common law). We also include information about whether lower courts agreed on a decision or not.
The second database provides us with information about each justice. We include their political party affiliation at time of nomination, their prior judicial experience, and the years of experience in the court at the time of the decision. We also include the Segal-Cover (SC) score of the nominees ideology and qualifications. 16 The lower panel of Table 1 (in the Appendix) summarizes this information for each justice in our data.
Estimation
In this section, we describe the estimation procedure. We begin with an identification discussion which contains a general description of our two-step estimation procedure. Subsequently, we consider estimation in the simplest case, in which both justices and cases are homogeneous, and then move on to the fully heterogeneous model. We say that the court is homogeneous when θ i = θ and π i = π for i = 1, . . . , n. We say that the cases before the court are homogeneous when all the parameters of the model,
, as well as ρ, are assumed to be invariant to the characteristics of the case. We say that the cases before the court are heterogeneous when these parameters can vary with some case specific characteristics X t .
Identification
Clearly, identification of our voting model from vote data alone is challenging: as Londregan (1999), among others, have noted, from binary data on votes it is difficult to recover estimates of the continuous preference distributions of voters, without additional modelling and/or parametric restrictions. In our model, these additional restrictions come in the form of the parametric restrictions on voters' preferences and the information structure, detailed in Section 3 above. In this section, we present an argument as to the identification of these model parameters from the observed vote data. Our argument has two parts, which will later be mimicked for estimation: first, we show that the justices' priors and their "reduced-form" voting probabilities are identified from the vote data; second, we show that the parameters of voters' preferences and the information structure are identified from the reduced-form vote probabilities.
We introduce the following notation:
Given this notation, the first-step estimation problem (in both the expressive as well as the strategic case) is to maximize the following reduced-form likelihood function for the votes:
Conditional on the state ω t , the individual votes v it are independent across the justices i. Thus, the vector of votes v t follows a multivariate mixture distribution, with mixing probability ρ.
Identification of the state-specific voting probabilities {γ i,1 , γ i,0 } n i=1 and the mixing probability ρ are available in, eg., Hall and Zhou (2003) , Hu (2008) , and Kasahara and Shimotsu (2007) .
Intuitively, consider the US Supreme Court, where there are n = 9 justices. Thus the vote vector v t can take 2 9 values and, with a large enough dataset, it is possible to estimate the probability that v t takes each of these values by the empirical frequency. On the other hand, there are only 19 parameters (18 vote probabilities, and ρ) to estimate. Since 2 9 >> 19, a necessary condition for identification is satisfied. The above-cited papers contain constructive identification proofs, which can be directly mimicked for estimation. For our purposes, we found it more convenient to maximize the likelihood function (6) directly. This constituted the first step of our estimation procedure. 17
For the second step, we need to recover two structural parameters, π i and θ i , for each justice i. To do this, we use the estimates of the two justice-specific vote probabilitiesγ i,1 andγ i,0 , from the first step. Justice i's private information is s it = ω t + 1 θ i ε it , with ε it ∼ N (0, 1). Then 17 These identification arguments continue to hold if all the parameters, as well as P r(vt), depend on some covariates X. Moreover, the inequality γi,1 > γi,0, which is implied by the monotone likelihood ratio property, is crucial for identification: without this assumption, the voting probabilities would only be identified up to an arbitrary classification of ωt. This inequality resolves this classification problem by setting γi,1 (γi,0) equal to the maximum (minimum) of the two identified voting probabilities.
. Solving these equations for θ i and s * i givenγ i,1 andγ i,0 (and substituting Φ −1 (γ i,1 ) = −Φ −1 (1 − γ i,1 )) giveŝ
Two remarks are in order. First, note that our estimate of the precision of i's informationθ is given by the difference between the conditional probabilities of voting in favor of the Plaintiff when the law favors the Plaintiff (ω = 1) and when the law favors the Defendant (ω = 0). This is very intuitive in light of the theoretical model. Moreover, it implies that precision increases symmetrically with a larger probability of correctly ruling in favor of the Plaintiff and a larger probability of correctly ruling in favor of the Defendant. The estimate of the equilibrium cutpoint, instead, is a decreasing function of the ratio Φ −1 (γ 1 )/Φ −1 (1 −γ 0 ). Thusŝ decreases the bigger is the probability of voting correctly in favor of the Plaintiff (γ 1 ) relative to the probability of correctly voting in favor of the Defendant (1 − γ 0 ). A value ofŝ above and below 1/2 reflects an underlying asymmetry, with the probability of voting correctly in favor of the Plaintiff being larger (smaller) than the probability of correctly voting in favor of the Defendant. Second, note that up to this point it was not necessary to specify whether justices vote expressively or strategically. This is a remarkable property of this problem. It implies that the precision estimate is independent of whether justices care about the court ruling or about their own vote being correct, and therefore of whether justices use the information contained in the event of them being pivotal or simply best respond to their own private information.
In order to recover the bias parameter π i , we use the equilibrium voting condition, which differs between the expressive and strategic models. In the case of the expressive voting model, this is given by
while in the strategic voting model this is given by
For both models, plugging in our estimates of θ i andŝ i into the appropriate equilibrium condition allows us to recover estimates ofπ exp i andπ * i for the expressive and strategic models, respectively. 18
The Homogeneous Model
As a starting point, we consider the simplest case, where justices and cases are homogeneous.
Because justices are homogeneous, in each case all justices have the same cutpoint s * it = s * t for all i ∈ N . Moreover, because the cases are homogeneous, s * t = s * for all t = 1, . . . , T . This in turn implies that the individual state-contingent probabilities of ruling in favor of the Plaintiff given the true state ω t are constant across i and t. We denote these by γ 1 ≡ (1 − Φ(θ[s * − 1])) and γ 0 ≡ Φ(θs * ). It follows from (2) that in equilibrium the likelihood of the votes from one case is just a bivariate mixture binomial likelihood. Letting C t denote the number of votes against the Defendant, the log-likelihood for the full sample is then:
Together with the maximum likelihood estimate of the prior ρ and the estimate of precision θ as given by (7), equations (8) and (9) allow us to to estimate the parameters (ρ, π, θ) of the expressive and the strategic voting models.
To illustrate the approach, we use this procedure to estimate the homogeneous model for each natural court with nine justices. 19 Separating the data by natural court implies that the composition of the court in each sample remains unchanged. This therefore assumes the same precision and bias for all justices in any given court, as well as the same prior for all cases considered by any court, but allows different natural courts to have different parameters. Table   2 presents the results.
[ Table 2 about here]
Columns 2-4 contain the maximum likelihood estimates of the individual state-contingent probabilities γ 1 and γ 0 of ruling in favor of the Plaintiff given the true state ω t , as well as the prior probability ρ of the true state in any case t being ω t = 1. Thus, for example, in WAR8, the true state favors the Plaintiff with probability ρ = Pr(ω t = 1) = 0.769, and conditional on this reason, we consider a one-parameter specification of the information structure; with additional parameters, we might not have identification.
19 This leaves three courts with too few observations to provide reliable estimates: WAR1 (59 observations), WAR4 (30 observations) and ROBT1 (23 observations). We exclude these data from the analysis. the true state being favorable to the Plaintiff, any individual justice votes to rule in favor of the Plaintiff with probability γ 1 = Pr(v it = 1|ω t = 1) = 0.853. When instead the true state is favorable to the Defendant, a justice votes to rule in favor of the Plaintiff with probability γ 0 = Pr(v it = 1|ω t = 0) = 0.168. From (7) then, we can compute the estimate for the (common) precision of justices in this natural court, θ = 2.011 and the equilibrium cutpoint s * = −0.022.
Given s * and θ, we can then compute the bias π st that is consistent with the strategic voting model using (9), which in this case is equal to π st = 0.664. We can also compute the bias π exp that is consistent with the expressive voting model using (8). Doing this for WAR8 gives π exp = 0.753.
Thus, according to the strategic voting model, this court required less evidence to rule against a Defendant (Pr(ω t = 1|E) ≥ π st for any given information E) than according to the expressive voting model (Pr(ω t = 1|E) ≥ π exp ). The difference in the two estimates of the justices' bias comes from the equilibrium inference of strategic justices. For any given justice i, the event of being pivotal is relatively more likely if the true state is favorable to the Defendant than if the true state is favorable to the Plaintiff. In other words, equilibrium information is favorable to the Defendant. For this to be consistent with equilibrium, justices have to have a larger bias in favor of the Plaintiff, as indicated in the "Bias" columns in Table 2 .
The Heterogeneous Model
The previous homogeneous model was clearly restrictive: not only are justices' precision and bias parameters assumed to be the same, but also these parameters, as well as the case prior parameter ρ, are assumed to be invariant to case-specific characteristics. This implies that justices are assumed to have a common bias, precision of information and prior beliefs in both criminal and economic cases, or in issues pertaining to both federal institutions and basic rights. Similarly, it implies that justices cannot have a different preference or ability to map the case to the legislative intent when the Federal Government is or is not a party in a case, or when the case involves only interpreting a law, or challenging its constitutionality. This is clearly very restrictive. Moreover, if in fact attitudes or abilities do vary with these or other covariates, our estimates will reflect the mix of cases observed in the sample.
To allow the parameters of the model to vary with observable characteristics X t , we will parameterize ρ t ≡ Pr(ω t = 1) to depend on the characteristics X t via a logit expression:
Once the prior probability ρ t varies across cases, so will the equilibrium strategies s * it , and hence so will the justice-specific probabilities of ruling against the Defendant in each state, γ it,1 and γ it,0 . Because of this, the model becomes more difficult. One possibility is to undertake "direct" estimation where, for each value of the parameters, we need to solve for the equilibrium cutpoints using equations (4) for each justice and each case. Obviously, this is computationally quite cumbersome. Therefore, we propose a procedure which builds on our previous methodology.
Since we know that the heterogeneous cases will cause the justice-specific probabilities of ruling in favor of the Plaintiff to vary across cases, we parameterize these in the following way, which also restricts γ i,t,1 ≥ γ i,t,0 , for all X t :
, ∈ [0, 1];
In the first stage, we estimate the parameters (β, δ, η) as well as the justice-specific variables (α i , ζ i ) for i = 1, . . . , n. For this, we maximize the following likelihood function
For the second stage, we use the predicted values of γ i,t,1 and γ i,t,0 to recover case and justice specific values of θ it and s * it , using the equations in (7). We can then compute the bias estimates solving the n equations (4) for the strategic voting model, or (1) (with equality) for the expressive voting model.
Identification of Priors and Case Selection. The first-step likelihood function (11) includes the parameter ρ, describing justices' common prior beliefs about the "right" judgment in the cases.
Obviously, these priors are not directly observed, and here we consider how these are identified from the data.
Note that letting ρ to vary in response to the voting data allows us to control for "case selection", which is the possibility that the set of cases facing a court is not balanced, but rather a selected sample of available cases. Specifically, by examining the likelihood problem (11), we see that -for given covariates X t -the parameters β in the prior ρ(X t , β) should be set so that ρ(X t , β) is high (resp. low) when justices vote more often in favor of (resp. against) the plaintiff.
Thus, case selection which favors cases for which the court is likely to rule in favor of the Plaintiff is built into this identification scheme. 20
However, if case selection were not present, then this identification scheme may lead to unreliable estimates of justices' biases. For instance, if all the justices were ideological with π i close to zero, P r(v it = 1) would be high regardless of the realization of ω t . In this case, voting behavior would not reflect priors at all, and it would be inappropriate to identify the priors from the observed votes. In this case, estimating the priors from the data, in the absence of case selection, may lead to underestimation of the justices' biases. This ambiguity in identification should be kept in mind when interpreting the results, to which we now turn.
Results
In this section, we describe our results for the heterogeneous model described above. As before, we restrict attention to cases in which all nine justices voted. 21 The covariates are those that were described in Section 4. As case-specific covariates, we include characteristics of the Plaintiff and the Defendant (whether Plaintiff and Defendant are a Local Government, the Federal Government, or private parties), the authority for decision (whether this is a case that involves the interpretation of a Federal Law, a challenge that a Federal Law is unconstitutional, or others), and the disposition of the case by lower courts (whether the lower courts agree or not). To further 20 In Daughety and Reinganum's (2006) model of information-based case selection, this corresponds to the scenario where the SC tends to hear "sure-bet" cases where the Plaintiff is "right" (ie. ωt = 1) with high prior probability.
21 Note that in the heterogeneous model, the equilibrium cutpoint of each justice will be different for each different composition of the voting members of the court, implying different conditional probabilities of ruling in favor of the Plaintiff in each state for each configuration of voting members, even fixing the covariates Xt. Including only the votes in which all justices vote therefore dramatically reduces the number of parameters to be estimated. This still leaves a significant number of cases in the sample, with a total of 5408 cases across Basic Rights issues (2447), Economic issues (1203), Criminal issues (1334), Federal issues (406) and other issues (17). A large fraction of the remaining 1732 cases in which less than nine justices vote have 8 votes (1266 in total). We use these cases for out-of-sample validation of the alternative strategic and expressive voting models.
control for endogenous case selection, we also include the identity of the chief justice at the time of consideration of the case (Warren, Burger, Rehnquist, or Roberts). In order to allow maximal flexibility in the order of justices' bias along different issues, we do not include the type of issue under consideration as a covariate, but instead compute different sets of estimates for Basic Rights issues, Economic issues, Criminal issues, and Federal issues. 22 As justice-specific covariates we include the number of years of prior judicial experience, the political party of the President that nominated the justice (Democratic or Republican Nominee), and the Segal-Cover measures of ideology and quality. We also include three variables that vary per case and justice. These are each justice's years of experience at the Court at the time of the ruling, and, for each justice i, the average Segal-Cover scores of justices other than i sitting in the Court that ruled in the case.
The inclusion of these last two variables merits some additional discussion. Under simple expressive voting, a justice's vote is not affected by her colleagues, so that the coefficients on these covariates should be zero. Under strategic voting, however, the justices' votes are interdependent, and these coefficients should be significantly nonzero. Including the covariates for the average Segal-Cover scores for the other justices therefore allows us to informally test the strategic vs. the expressive voting model. Table 3 presents the "first stage" MLE estimates of the coefficients of the common prior function ρ(X t ), and of the state-contingent probabilities of ruling against the Defendant γ 0 (X t , Z it ) and γ 1 (X t , Z it ). Note that for all issues other than Federal (for which the small sample size leads to uniformly larger standard errors), all the coefficients of the case-specific and justice-specific variables are statistically significant in the specification of at least one of our first-stage parameters. Either the justices' common prior that the Plaintiff should win the case, or the individual probabilities of ruling correctly and incorrectly in favor of the Plaintiff are significantly different depending on whether the Plaintiff or the Defendant are themselves the Federal Government, a Local Government, or a private party, on whether previous courts agreed on a ruling or not, etc.
Moreover, in both Criminal and Basic Rights' cases, this is also true for the justice and case specific variables, and thus in particular for the ideology and information precision of other justices.
This suggests that the strategic voting model is appropriate, for a large subset of the cases. 22 The results of carrying out our estimation pooling all votes and introducing "issue" as an additional covariate are otherwise similar to the issue-by-issue estimation (results are available from the authors upon request).
[ Table 3 about here]
The Value of Information in the Court
Given the first stage coefficients we can compute, for any case t with characteristics X t , the common prior ρ t = ρ(X t ), as well as the conditional probabilities γ i,t,0 = γ 0 (X t , Z it ) and γ i,t,1 = γ 1 (X t , Z it ) that a Justice with characteristics Z it in case t rules against the Defendant in each state of nature. We can then use the predicted values of γ i,t,1 and γ i,t,0 to recover case and justice specific values of s * it , and the "deep parameters" θ it and π it (for both the strategic and the expressive voting models). In particular, we can do this for cases with characteristics X t = x and the actual justices and courts observed in the realized history. To describe the main results we will focus for the most part on cases of statutory interpretation in which both the Plaintiff and the Defendant are private parties, and in which lower courts have agreed on a ruling. Table 4 presents the complete set of estimates in Basic Rights issues for the longest-lived natural courts for each of the four chief justices in our data: WAR8 (1962-64) , with chief justice Warren; BUR6 (1975-80) , with chief justice Burger; REHN7 (1994 REHN7 ( -2004 , with chief justice Rehnquist; and ROBT2 (2005-08) , with chief justice Roberts.
[ Table 4 about here]
For each court, we indicate the MLE estimate of the common prior probability that the law favors the Plaintiff. Thus, in WAR8 and REHN7 the prior is lower (ρ = 0.558 and ρ = 0.566 respectively) than in the BUR6 and ROBT2 courts (ρ = 0.617 and ρ = 0.616 respectively). This indicates case selection: the Burger and Roberts courts selected basic rights cases that were ex ante more favorable to the Plaintiff than the Warren and Rehnquist courts.
The first two columns present the MLE estimates of the probability that justice i rules in favor of the Plaintiff when the law favors the Defendant (γ it0 ) and when the law favors the Plaintiff (γ it1 ). Thus for example, in WAR8 justice Harlan had a probability of γ it1 = 0.918 of correctly ruling in favor of the Plaintiff, and a probability of 1−γ it0 = 1−0.276 = 0.724 of correctly ruling in favor of the Defendant. Column 3 presents the estimate of the informativeness or precision of each justice's signal. As we pointed out earlier, this is an increasing function of the difference between the probability that justice i rules in favor of the Plaintiff when the law favors the Plaintiff and when the law favors the Defendant. The larger precision for White relative to Douglas in WAR8, for example, reflects both a higher probability of ruling for the Plaintiff when the law favors the Given these estimates, we can compute our measure of the value of information in the court, FLEX. This is the probability that justice i votes differently than what she would have voted for in the absence of her private case information. To compute this, we first calculate how each justice would have voted with no private information. From (1), this is simply v it = 1 if ρ ≥ π i and v it = 0 otherwise (vote for the Plaintiff if the public information, as summarized by ρ, outweights the private bias π i ). Then we compare this initial leaning to the probability of voting differently after observing her private information; i.e., FLEX measures the probability that a justice would "change her mind" after observing her private information (vote for the Defendant even when ρ ≥ π i , or for the Plaintiff even when ρ < π i ):
This is presented in columns 8 and 9 of the court. Note in particular that justice Thomas has has a smaller precision (2.164 vs 2.309) and is more biased than justice Roberts (|0.531 − 1/2| > |0.484 − 1/2|). In spite of this, Thomas has a higher FLEX score than justice Roberts. The reason for this is that Roberts' bias and priors (ρ = 0.616) both support the plaintiff, leaving less room for the case information to change his mind. In contrast, Thomas' bias runs in the opposite direction of the prior, which allows the case information a larger role in his decision-making.
Armed with our measure of the value of information in the court for all justices and case characteristics, we can now address several key questions about the determinants of supreme court decisions.
How has the open-mindedness of justices changed over time? Some Supreme Court scholars have argued that the confirmation process for nominees have become more politicized over time. See in particular Epstein, Lindstadt, Segal, and Westerland (2006) , who argue that the trend toward greater attention to ideology started not with (the failed confirmation of) Robert H. Bork, but instead earlier, with appointments to the Warren Court. To assess this possibility, we present, in Figure 1 , the median value of FLEX, precision, and bias in the expressive and strategic model per court.
23 Note that for the WAR8, BUR6, and ROBT2 courts, the FLEX measures are the same for both the strategic and expressive voting models. From Eq. (12), we see that FLEX differs between the two models only through the justice bias parameter πi. For a given justice i, if the event˘ρ ≥ π Variations in open-mindedness across justices and issues Having considered the macrolevel trends in FLEX over time, we next explore how our measures of FLEX vary across justices, and across cases. Table 5 contains the average FLEX scores for each justice across different courts and issues.
[ Table 5 about here]
Note that with the exception of justice Burton, all FLEX scores are below 1/2. That is, in general, it is more likely than not that their vote will echo their initial leanings, based on their bias and priors. Having said this, the FLEX scores are relatively large: on average, the probability of voting differently than what they would have voted for in the absence of case information is about 44%.
24 These numbers use the expressive voting model. The corresponding figures for the strategic voting model are 23%, 36% and 32%).
Of the thirty one justices in our database, nineteen have average FLEX scores within one standard deviation (4%) of the mean (from Powell to Harlan in the Figure) . Five justices (including two chief justices) have FLEX scores above this thresholds: Burton, Rehnquist, Thomas, Black and Warren. Of the five, four are Republican (all but Black), and three are from the earlier period of the Court (Warren, Black and Burton). In fact, of the ten justices with highest FLEX scores, seven are from the earlier period of the court. On the other side of the distribution, there are seven justices with average FLEX scores below one standard deviation from the mean (Breyer, Jackson, Marshall, Brennan, Minton, Goldberg and Ginsburg), and all of them are Democrats.
In addition, both the literature and a cursory glance at the data suggests that we should expect both the bias and possibly also the precision estimates to vary greatly across different issue areas. The results confirm the expectations. The typical FLEX score in Economic issues (53%) is much larger than in the remaining areas. In fact, this dominance also holds regarding the entire distribution: the 15 % percentile of Economic FLEX scores is also above the average FLEX scores in other areas. Federalism follows with an average FLEX score close to the overall average (45 %). FLEX is lowest for Basic Rights (40 %) and Criminal Procedure (39%). 25 There is also significant variation among areas at the individual justice level (although this variation does not necessarily coincide with the ranking of the averages; for example justices Clark, Powell and Minton have a larger FLEX score in Criminal Procedure than in Economic issues).
Do justices tend to be more open-minded when a Government is involved in a case, or when they consider the constitutionality of a law enacted by Congress? In the presentation of results so far, we fixed both Plaintiffs and Defendants to be private parties. Here we focus on whether having the US Government or a Local Government as a Plaintiff affects the value of information in the court, and if so, how.
The first way in which the Government affects the results is by changing justices common prior beliefs. Across all issues, justices attach a higher probability to the government being right 25 The table shows a relatively large average bias in favor of the plaintiff in Criminal cases. It should be noted, though, that most criminal cases do not have a private Plaintiff pitted against a private Defendant as we are maintaining here for consistency of the comparison. Instead most cases involve either the Federal or a Local Government facing a private party. As we will show below, the distinction turns out to be important, since having the Federal government as Plaintiff increases the bias in criminal cases by around 0.7 (see figure 8) . Note that even with this clarification, Criminal cases show a larger overall bias for one of the sides in the dispute. than they do a private party. The difference is substantial in Criminal Procedure (0.54) and Basic Rights (0.21), and more modest in Economics and Federalism (0.03). 26
But a Government Plaintiff does not only affect the priors. In the top two panels of Figure   3 we compute, for each justice and issue class, the differential bias and FLEX scores when the Plaintiff is the US Government (or a Local Government) and when the Plaintiff is a private party.
We then report in the figure the median and 25-75 percentiles in the distribution of these changes at the individual justice level.
[ Figure 3 about here]
The figure shows that in some issue areas, the change in type of Plaintiff has a large effect on justices' preferences. In particular, changing the Plaintiff from a private party to the US (local) Government leads to a median increase of 0.38 (0.28) in π exp in Basic Rights, and to a median increase of 0.74 (0.72) in π exp in Criminal cases. Now recall that our measure of ideological bias (π i ) is the parameter in justices preferences that quantifies the relative cost of ruling incorrectly against the defendant (π i ) vis a vis ruling incorrectly against the plaintiff (1 − π i ). Moreover π i also has a second direct interpretation: it is the cutpoint such that justice i will rule in favor of the plaintiff whenever the probability that the law favors the plaintiff is above π i . Thus justices appear to have more stringent requirements for the Government, in particular within Criminal Procedure.
In the lower panels of Figure 3 , we focus on whether judicial review cases have important differences from cases of statutory interpretation. It is important to keep in mind here that most cases of judicial review are in the Basic Rights and Criminal issues. The change appears to have no effect on either bias or FLEX scores within Criminal Procedure. Within Basic Rights cases, however, justices do appear to be more open-minded in cases that merit judicial review.
Mistakes and Implications for Institutional Design
In any given case, the Court comes up with a single ruling. The Court being a collective body, this single ruling requires aggregating the individual opinions in one way or the other. The Supreme Court aggregates the individual votes of its members by simple majority rule. In this section we address two questions. First, we provide a measure of performance: what is the probability that the court reaches a decision that is contrary to the true meaning of the law? Second, we ask whether this performance would improve or decline if the court were to use a different mechanism for aggregating the votes of individual justices. In particular, we compare the performance of the court with a counterfactual scenario in which ruling against the Defendant requires the unanimous consent of the justices.
We begin by computing the probability of mistakes in the Court. Note that for any given case characteristics X, our first stage estimates provide the individual probabilities of ruling for the Defendant when the law favors the Plaintiff 1 − γ i,1 , and for the Plaintiff when the law favors the Defendant, γ i,0 (we drop the obvious dependence on X to simplify notation). For a simple majority rule, we then use these individual conditional probabilities to compute the probability that the Court will rule for the Defendant when the law favors the Plaintiff, Pr(v = d|ω = 1), and for the Plaintiff when the law favors the Defendant, Pr(v = p|ω = 0). 27 Given a prior ρ, we can then compute the total probability of an incorrect ruling for the Supreme Court, β SC
The upper panel of Figure 4 shows β SC and Pr(v = p|ω = 0) for Basic Rights issues (for both the strategic and expressive voting models). 28 Both the total probability of error β SC and the conditional probability of error Pr(v = p|ω = 0) are around 6% throughout our sample, with significant variations across different courts.
How do these compare with performance under a unanimity rule? To evaluate this, we need to compute the probability of mistakes under unanimity. Now, in the expressive voting model, this is straightforward. Here behavior is unaffected by the aggregation mechanism, and therefore so are the individual strategy cutpoints and conditional probabilities. The only change is in the aggregation rule. Here the probability of the court ruling for the Defendant when the law favors the Plaintiff is 1 − 9 i=1 (1 − γ i,1 ) and the probability of the court ruling for the Plaintiff when the law favors the Defendant is 9 i=1 γ i,0 . Thus the total probability of an incorrect ruling for the 27 Letting C(k) denote the set of coalitions with exactly k members, Pr(v = d|ω = 1) = P 9
∈C γi,1, and Pr(v = p|ω = 0) =
(1 − γi,0). 28 As before, for exposition purposes here we focus on private parties, lower courts agree, statutory interpretation.
Supreme Court under unanimity rule in the expressive voting model is
In the strategic voting model, the computation of the total probability of mistakes under unanimity rule requires an additional step because the aggregation mechanism now clearly affects equilibrium behavior. Thus we cannot use the conditional probabilities of ruling for the Defendant recovered from justices' votes, but rather we must recompute the behavioral probabilities that are consistent with equilibrium behavior under unanimity. Fortunately, this is not difficult to do given our previous results. Given our estimates {(π ST i , θ i )} we can use Eq. (4) with R to compute the equilibrium strategy cutpoints s * * i consistent with unanimity rule. Given s * * , we can then compute γ * * i,1 = 1−Φ(θ i [s * * i −1]) and γ * * i,0 = 1−Φ(θ i s * * i ). Then the total probability of an incorrect ruling for the Supreme Court under unanimity rule in the strategic voting model β U ST is
The lower panel of Figure 4 puts everything together (again, for Basic Rights issues). In the expressive voting model, unanimity with heterogeneous justices leads to very large error rates, almost entirely due to rulings that incorrectly favor the Defendant. In the strategic voting model, the comparison is more involved. Unanimity rule here sometimes leads to a lower total error, because of the lower probability of incorrectly ruling for the Defendant than simple majority rule.
The reason why majority rule outperforms unanimity rule in the Warren courts is that justices' biases are much larger here than in the Burger, Rehnquist or Roberts courts (see Figure 2 ). This increases the probability of ruling incorrectly for the Plaintiff in both majority rule and unanimity, but it has a far more devastating effect in unanimity. The lower median bias in the later courts reduces this effect. On the other hand, unanimity diminishes the probability of ruling incorrectly for the Defendant. In the Rehnquist courts, this effect outweights the first and generates a lower error rate than simple majority rule.
A similar analysis for the remaining issues confirm these conclusions (see Figure 5 ). When justices are very biased, unanimity rule leads to large errors, and majority rule dominates. When justices are less biased, one rule or the other can be better depending on the parameters of the problem. With heterogeneous individuals in a small committee, majority rule does not generically dominate unanimity rule.
Conclusion
In this paper we have presented results from a voting model for the US Supreme Court in which votes reflect both justices' personal ideologies, as well as their endeavor to "get it right": to rule according to an accurate and faithful interpretation of the law as it applies to the specifics of each case. In this context, we study whether case information has enough power to overturn the prior biases and ideological considerations of the justices?
To tackle this question, we introduce a new estimation approach that allows us to handle our model of voting with common values and strategic agents. The model is estimated in two steps.
In the first step, using the observed votes, we estimate a "reduced-form" model of justices' probabilities of voting in favor of the Plaintiff when the law favors the Plaintiff and when the law favors the Defendant. In the second step, we recover the structural parameters characterizing justices' preferences and information services, using the equilibrium conditions in the voting model. In closing, we want to emphasize some of the limitations of our results. Possibly the most important of these is that our analysis paints a necessarily incomplete picture of the court. The final up or down decision on which we focus is undoubtedly an important part of court rulings.
However, a second element is also crucial: the opinions of the court. Because of the principle of stare decisis, lower court judges must follow the precedents set by the Supreme Court, as well as their written justification. Thus the opinions are particularly important in terms of the long run implications of the court rulings. Clearly our estimates of bias, ability to infer the meaning of the law, and of the value of information in the court are limited to the voting decisions of the justices, and say nothing about the determinants of the opinions, or their implications.
Appendix
Suppose that justices care about the outcome of the court ruling and are fully strategic. Any justice i would then consider the implications of her vote assuming she is pivotal for the decision.
In this case the relevant information for justice i in case t is not only the private information s it but also the realization that i is pivotal for the court's decision, given the equilibrium strategy profile σ −i followed by the remaining justices. Thus in this case it is optimal for i to rule against the Defendant if and only if
But given the strict MLRP satisfied by the conditional normal distributions, this implies that the best response to any strategy of the remaining justices is a cutoff strategy,
Lemma 1
The best response to any strategy of the remaining justices is a cutoff strategy, i.e., in any equilibrium σ i satisfies
Proof. The proof follows Duggan and Martinelli (2001) , and is included here for convenience only. Suppose that σ i satisfies the hypothesis. Define the sets V ≡ {s ∈ S : J(σ −i , s) > 0}
and W ≡ {s ∈ S : J(σ −i , s) < 0}, and consider σ i such that σ i (s) < 1 for some s ∈ V and σ i (s) > 0 for some s ∈ W . Define A(s) ≡ U (p|P ) Pr(P |s, piv) + U (p|D) Pr(D|s, piv) and B(s) ≡ U (d|P ) Pr(P |s, piv) + U (d|D) Pr(D|s, piv). The net expected payoff of voting to rule against the Defendant vis a vis voting to rule in favor of the Defendant is
Now, since
it follows that A(s) − B(s) > 0 if and only if Pr(P |s, piv) Pr(D|s, piv)
Now, s ∈ V implies that J(σ −i , s) > 0, which in turn implies that A(s) − B(s) > 0. Similarly, s ∈ W implies that J(σ −i , s) < 0, which in turn implies that A(s) − B(s) < 0. Then ∆ > 0, which concludes the proof. 
